Thoughts and Praise on JfJfP - Jews for Justice for Palestinians

[Click here for a Hebrew version of this post.]

I met with Dan Judelson of Jews for Justice for Palestinians this week. I prepared a mental list of questions that interest me, concerning political activism around Israel / Middle East in England. The two major questions I had could be focused on the title of the organization: (a) why (only) Jews? and (b), why (only) for Palestinians? The thing that struck me the most in the meeting with Dan, is that these two questions were answered before I had the chance to ask them. These topics simply came up in the first introductory remarks that Dan made about JFJFP. To me, this was perhaps the most important sign for a good political organization.

I’ll explain: the biggest danger of any political organization is that it can become political in the sense of party politics, concerned solely with its image in the media, its survival and/or growth. When a political organization turns into this solely-politics groups, it obviously loses its justification of existence, but more importantly it fossilizes in its old beliefs, afraid that any shift of opinions might turn people away, or seem like an admission of failure (I think Peace Now is a good example for that in Israeli politics).

The most important pre-emptive remedy against this fossilization is a constant introspection and self-criticism, not fearing that questioning one’s own stance weakens it, but rather recognizes that it is precisely this self-questioning and the acknowledgment that the stance is not perfect or free of flaws that endows with its power of truth. Having stressed that I believe JFJFP to be a vibrant, thoughtful political organization, I return to those two questions that bugged me before meeting Dan, and that I was happy to find out that people at JFJFP are even more concerned about them than I am.

Why (only) Jews? I have sought more than once a venue for political action (or at least, a platform for dialogue) concerning Israel in Princeton. I sadly had to recognize that I have to options: a pro-Israel Jewish group, or a pro-Palestine group. I don’t identify myself as either pro-Israel or pro-Palestinian, if either of those labels compels me to support wrongdoings of either side. I am an Israeli, and as such have stronger, uncontrollable sentiments for Israel than for Palestine, but I am not pro-Israel. I am pro-peace and pro-equality. As such, I will be equivocally critical of Israelis and Palestinians when their actions do not correlate with my vision for peace, equality and co-existence.

Why, then, I asked Dan, a need for a Jewish peace group? Why not simply a peace organization that is inclusive and not based on ethnicity or religion (depending on your understanding of Jewish)? The important thing to keep in mind is that JFJFP is a Jewish organization that constantly questions this limit of identity, as I said. The on-going collaboration of JFJFP with other groups is a proof that this definition of Jewish certainly does not point to an understanding as if only Jews can support a peace in the middle-east, or any other understanding of Jewish exceptionalism. Rather, it is a response to the consensus of Jewish communities, including the UK, which tends to be pro-Israel as such. In other words, it is precisely the actions of Jewish organizations, portraying Jews as unconditionally supportive of Israel, that furnishes the background for the justification for a different Jewish voice. One that will most probably not replace other Jewish voices, but contributes to the diversity of opinions, diffusing to a degree the view that sees all Jews as holding the same opinion or subscribing to the same loyalties.

Why (only) for Palestinians? This question can be divided to several different questions, mainly the nationalist question (“why are you more concerned about Palestinians than about Jews?”) or the not-so-naïve-as-it-may-seem cosmopolitan question (“why are you more concerned about Israeli oppression of Palestinians than about Chinese oppression / Darfur / Global Warming / the price of underwear these days?”)

Personally, I don’t find either question valid, since they assume a political activist is acting in a void. A person who chooses to invest their time and efforts in the Palestinian cause does not claim that it is more important than global warming. Rather, being well-aware that there is activity done for global warming, he or she seek activity in an issue that is personally closer to their hearts. In other words, no-one has endless resources to attend to all the problems of the world. Therefore, the “cosmopolitan” question is ultimately a call for no-action.

As for the Zionist/nationalist version of this question, Dan had an interesting take on it. First of all, the question implies that Jews/Israelis and Palestinians share an equal status right now, and therefore deserve equally the same justice. Of course, both Israelis and Palestinians deserve justice, but the title of JFJFP, recognizes that Palestinians suffer right now from injustice, an acknowledgment many Jews will have a hard time to accept.

Dan and I agreed that the nation-state is probably not the best form of union or manner of promoting justice in the world, but as long as it exists, the Jewish people have a right for a nation-state, as do the Palestinians. In this, by the way, Dan admitted that he does not represent the whole of JFJFP as its members represent a wide range of approaches to Israel and Zionism, from anti-Zionism on one end to Zionism on the other.

So, back to the question, why “(only) for Palestinians”? First of all, “Justice” is an operative word in that title. It is not “Jews for Palestine” (a reassuring emphasis, for my readers who know my disapproval of left-wing confusion of humanitarian struggle of the Palestinians with their national struggle); nor is it “Jews for Palestinians”. It is specifically targeting the injustice Palestinians suffer by Israel. It does not even claim that this is the only injustice in Israel. However, it is the one injustice that transcends beyond the boundaries of inner-social conflicts and bears consequences on international law and the international arena – which reminds me of another question we touched on.

This title bears it price, of course, especially among those who hear “for Palestinians” and interpret that to mean “against Israel”. This is a notion that is not completely false, to be frank, since Israelis and Palestinians are in a national struggle over the same piece of land. JFJFP, however, does not deny that struggle, only recognizes the current superiority of Israel, and the justice that both sides will have to benefit for the conflict to end.

The onslaught on Gaza in January (“Cast Lead”) brought the highest single jump of supporters to JFJFP, of about 10%. This is the kind of data Israeli leaders should definitely take into account when making decisions. Hopefully, Israelis will too begin to realize that pro-Israel need not equate “anti-Palestine,” nor “pro-Israel no matter what.”

Who are you to say? This is a question I was sure we were going to reach, although I personally deem it invalid as well. “You’re not living in Israel, therefore you have no right to tell Israelis what to do.” This is invalid for two reasons: first of all, many people who hold such a stance only hold it when it comes to criticizing the Israeli government. I’ve yet to hear someone claim – “you don’t live in Israel, therefore you have no right to raise a contribution to support the IDF / JNF / MDA, etc.” More importantly, I don’t acknowledge any constraints on freedom of thought. Like it or not, people form opinions about Israel living there or not, in the same vain that Israelis have strong opinions on Barack Obama, Gordon Brown, Nicolas Sarkozy, and so forth. Having a political group that addresses Israel’s wrongdoings in the international arena is no less legitimate than having an Israeli group supporting Tibet, and even more so, when taking into account the substantial support of Jewish Diaspora to, in fact, the sustainability of the State of Israel.

To these points of mine (I think we shared a sentiment there), Dan also added that it seems that Pro-Israel Jews are quick to criticize JFJFP for taking a stand on something they can’t hardly grasp (supposedly because they don’t live there), but that you would never hear a similar critique of a Jewish group taking on a remote issue, such as supporting demonstrations in Iran or in Myanmar. It is only a critical approach to Israel that raises this attack of “you don’t live there, therefore you can’t possibly know.”

The talk segued between the political to the personal, and encompassed much more than I can fit in this brief report. I deeply appreciated the depth and thoughtfulness, as I stated in the beginning, and was greatly impressed by the vast and diverse ties JFJFJP maintains with other activist groups in Israel and internationally. I am adding their website to my favorites, as an excellent resource of information, and invite readers to do the same.

[I tried meeting with activists in New York as well, by the way – from JATO and J-Street – but apparently they are too busy there to meet with your humble servant.]

What Isaac Luria "Knows"

In a message sent yesterday to J-Street subscribers against the equation of stopping settlements in the West Bank with ethnic cleansing (agreeably an unsound equation), Isaac Luria writes:

Unbelievable. As someone who cares about Israel's future, I know that stopping settlements - as well as Palestinian incitement and violence - are first steps towards a secure, Jewish, and democratic Israel through a two-state solution. Using terms like "ethnic cleansing" to undermine that agenda is incendiary and dangerous - and, I believe, not pro-Israel.

How does Luria know that stopping settlements are related to a secure, democratic Israel, or even a two-state solution? Perhaps he is endowed with some prophetic foresight. But as for myself, all I have are the facts on the ground. The fact is that the biggest disenfranchisement of freedom of movement from Palestinians, the most vile form of occupation, as well as the most elusive (and therefore also the worst) is taking place in Gaza strip, where settlements have all been destroyed three summers ago.

Israeli occupation of 1967 Palestinians is indeed undemocratic and should end. However, the settlements are merely one of the means of this occupation, and by far not the most important one. The one thing we've learned from the disengagement from Gaza, is that Israel can remove settlements and continue the unlawful occupation, while denying it to itself and the world.

The kind of rhetoric Luria presents conveys the precise "knowledge" that furnished the support for the disengagement plan, and will eventually lead to the same mistake in support of removal of settlements from Gaza. It will not provide peace and justice for Palestinians nor Israelis.

To learn more on the occupation in Gaza and how it continues to flourish without the settlements, read the detailed report by Gisha center (website).

Some Comments on Obama's Cairo Speech

President Barack Obama's speech in Cairo was inspiring and incisive (although we've practically beomce accustomed to that, certainly in his important speeches). I wish to make a few comments to responses I heard in Israeli media to the speech, and then conclude by saying something on political analysis of the speech.

Terror: Several right-wing leaders censured Obama for failing to mention the word "Terror". Minister Daniel Hershkowitz went as far as to say that "Obama ignored the fact that the Palestinians have yet to renounce terror" (actually, this translation is not accurate, since "renounce" refers primarily to declerations, whereas the quote in Hebrew read "did not abandon the way of terrorism" which refers to actions). Such a stupid remark might have its effect on Hershkowitz's supporters, but it is so unfaithful to Obama's words, it is hardly appropriate for a man of science. Obama did not ignore Palestinian terror, even if he did not use the word explicitly: he described the firing of Qasam rockets and suicide-bombing of buses, deeming them as immoral, and gave the struggle of blacks in America for equality and freedom as an exemplar for a just struggle that could only achieve its goals by peaceful actions.
More importantly, the substitution of the word "terror" with "violence" bears significance that right-wing Israelis should have been the first to embrace: terrorism is defined as the arbitrary attack of innocent civilians. Therefore, at least the attack of IDF soldiers would not be considered as terror, and some would even go as far as to say that attacks on civilians within the occupied territories should also not be seen as terrorism, since these civilans are not innocent (if one considers the occupation a crime, and the opposition to it as a legitimate cause). Thus, the choice of the word "violence" over "terror", and the full denouncement of violence as both immoral and impractical, includes attacks the right-wing Israelis would definitely want to include, while Palestinians would argue that these are not acts of terrorism, but of resistance.

Holocaust comparison: for some reason, when it comes to the Holocaust, people forget the rhetorical and analytical meaning of comparison. When we compare two things, we always take into account that some elements will be comparable, while others bear no similarity. Does the horror of the Holocaust prevent us from feeling compassion for someone else's suffering, acknowledge it or compensate for it? Does Israeli recognition of Palestinian suffering and their mistreatment – purposeful or not – entail a denial of the Holocaust or a comparison of Israel with Nazi Germany?

In order to understand correctly the comparison Obama made, we must bring a few things into account: first, that he was talking of a Jewish history of persecution that culminated in the Holocaust, but did not refer to the Holocaust alone. He spoke of this history as the justification for a Jewish state. If he were speaking of the Holocaust alone, this would be a gross historical distortion – the Holocaust is not the justification for Israel's existence, and anyone who claims otherwise is misrepresenting or misunderstanding history: were all the deeds and efforts of the Zionist movement prior to the Holocaust unjustified? So if Obama is speaking generally of a history of persecution, the comparison to the Palestinians is not as frightening, since no-one should fear that Israelis are equated to Nazis in this analogy (and again, there is no reason to fear the analogy itself, and all the more so when it was never made).
Second, Obama spoke of Palestinian suffering, but did not point fingers. Did he talk of the occupation since 1967 alone? Perhaps other factions that served to deprive the Palestinians of their independence should also be included, as Egypt, who ruled over Gaza and Jordan who controlled the West Bank? We can even go as back as the British and the Ottomans. This would be a more plausible understanding of his words, considering the historical context in which he placed them (and also the specific mention of "over sixty years"). But since the right-wing knows the Israel has mistreated the Palestinians, it automatically feels finger-pointed, and thus jumps to silence Obama's strong message, forbidding comparison or mention of Palestinian suffering.

Finally, we must take into account the political significance of the so-called "comparison". When the President spoke of the Holocaust, he condemned Holocaust denial in the strongest words, calling it "baseless, ignorant and hateful." He did not gain applause in this section, as he did not gain them at any point he made in favor of Israel. But by drawing this comparison he enfolded his demand for truthfulness: if the Arab world want an American president to speak on behalf of Palestinian suffering, it must cease from the shameful lie of Holocaust denial. Obama's message was loud and clear: this is not an issue of competition of suffering. Recognizing the dreads of the Holocaustm should not mean a denial of Palestinian suffering. How did Israelis respond to this deep message? "No, but we suffered more, how can you compare?!"

Change? Israelis are so used to American presidents visiting and delivering a speech that begins with a full sentence in Hebrew, that they forgot that this is a gimmick done everywhere. Rock stars and presidents alike, learn a few words by heart to repeat, thus creating a sense of familiarity. Obama quoted from the Koran and said a few words in Arabic not because of his identity or biography, but because this is how it's done. The difference is that for years now American presidents did not make an effort to promote cooperation and identification with the Arab world, and therefore used this gimmick in Israel, but not in Egypt. But it's a good thing that it's happening in Egypt. At the bottom line, Obama did not neglect Israel, spoke in its favor and declared very clearly that Israel and the U.S. have special, unbreakable ties. That was another point where he did not hear applause. He could have guessed that, and he said it anyway, and that is the important thing that concerned Israelis should note.

Political significance

Obama seeks to promote American interests in the region using a different tone and method than that of his predecessor. The fact that he speaks of interests whereas President Bush of morals, values and God, does not meant that Bush was less a politician or was less concerned with securing American interests. Certinaly, there is a stylistic and ideological difference between the two. This speech was intended to convey a change of attitude, demonstrate it, and endorse potential partners. This is how Obama's words of the historical enriching dialogue between Islam and the West should be understood. I heard people mock Obama for historical inaccuracies, but his speech was not a scholarly paper given by a historian in the academia, but the words of a politician seeking partnership (after writing this, I read the same argument by David Brooks in the NYT). In this partnership, of course, the U.S. will be a senior partner, not an equal. Obama opened his speech with a description pleasant for his audience, describing this partnership he seeks as the continuation of a tradition (another pleasant factor for the ear of a traditional society). He sought to dismantle the stereotype of the American who scorns Islamic culture (there are numerous examples of such scorn on You-Tube).

Simlarly, Obama described the veto on Iranian nuclear power (and any new nuclear ability) as a wide international consensus, expressed in a treaty, not as a veto of the U.S. alone. This served the exact same cause: to rid of U.S. image as a World Cop, which also happens to be an unfair cop. Like others, he drew an implicit connection between Natanz and Dimona , but not one that envisions a Middle-East under a nuclear umbrella, but rather a denuclearized Mideast.

We have no way of knowing if Obama's words are sincere. They sounded very sincere and very moving, and this is because he is a gifted orator. One measure might be the Palestinian issue. Here, too, Obama's words were inspired, aspiring to equality of two states living peacefully side by side.

However, there is no reason to assume that Obama is unaware of the enormous gap that will between these two states: militarily, economically and infrastructurally. Obama must be well-aware of the fact that the Palestinian state will not have a territorial continuum, and that the settlements that are planned to stay will disrupt the continuum in the West Bank alone. The various security measures Israel insists upon (and that some Palestinian leaders have already agreed to), will mar the little sovereignty that remains (for details, see my post on the Two-State Myth).

It has long been plausible in my views that such leaders as Tzipi Livni, Avigdor Lieberman, Yossi Beilin and Shimon Peres support the two-state solution not out of concern for Palestinian rights, but as means to preserve Israeli dominance while creating a façade of a democratic, egalitarian state in Israel. Is it not possible that behind Obama's lofty words, he sees it in the same way? At least, this is an option to consider.

The fact that an American president visited the Middle East without making a stop in Israel, was considered by many commentators to be one of the means of Pressure on Netanyahu. Did any of them stop to consider how many times an American President visited the Middle East without visiting this or that Arab country? Did any of these marginalized Arab countries consider this to be a sign of American pressure, or was it taken for granted? The conclusion, therefore, is that in order to have someone be afraid of the stick, you should first get them used to enjoying the carrot. After some thirty years of enmity between Iran and America, the U.S. has little sanctions it can impose on the Iranians that will bother them. They have learned to make do without a "unique relationship" with the U.S. The friendship and partnership Obama now offers to the Arab world is first and foremost intended to furnish the U.S. with more possibilities of influence and power in the region. While doing this, Obama continues to be concerned with Israeli interests, and supports a model for peace that many Israelis have already understood for years its potential for Israel in the ongoing struggle against the Palestinians. This should be kept in mind when listening to Obama.

Click here for a Hebrew version of this post.

More on the Israeli-Palestinian Perspective of Iran's Nuclear Efforts

Perhaps it is an irony of history that the issue of nuclear weapons in the Middle East is once again linked to the Palestinian issue. It is hard for me to imagine why the linkage between them should be so close, but time and again political pundits, high officials in American as well as Israeli government are stating that in order to make progress in the Iranian route, Israel must accept the two-state solution principle and quickly strive to implement it. Let us put aside for the time being the fact that "two-state" is somewhat of a misnomer, since both Barack Obama and Tony Blair are not deluding themselves that the Palestinian state will be anything but the most backward, most weakened state in the Middle East, with a very limited extent of sovereignty, if and when.

The nuclear issue has been linked to the Palestinian issue from the beginning. Thus, for example, according to Prof. Shlomo Aronson, who has recently published an essay (reference below) detailing the political struggle between Ben-Gurion and Levi Eshkol regarding Israel's nuclear ability (I am guessing that this is an elaboration of Aronson's previous work on nuclear weapons in the Middle East, but I haven't read it). According to Aronson, Ben-Gurion opposed the conquest of the West Bank since he foresaw that an occupation of a large number of Palestinians would weaken Israel's stance as a Jewish State. At the same time, he considered nuclear power as crucial for Israel, in order to compensate for Israel's clear disadvantage in resources, size and stamina. Israel Galili and Yigal Alon, on the other hand, opposed the development of nuclear weapons, and believed that seizure of more land in the West Bank could create a strategic depth that would serve as an alternate advantage, in place of nuclear power. Ben Gurion's comrades, Shimon Peres and Moshe Dayan, abandoned him when joining Levi Eshkol's emergency government, that enabled the conquest of the West Bank according to Alon's vision. Levi Eshkol is depicted by Aronson as a man of compromise, who did not lean to either of these positions: he opposed the development of nuclear weapons, but not to the point of completely halting the project, and according to Aronson he also did not intend to conquer the West Bank, although he did not oppose a limited operation there.

The essay raises further important points, such as the fact that Egypt considered Israel's development of nuclear power a casus belli; it declared so in 1965, and the circumstances that led to the 1967 war should be viewed in this context. According to Aronson, the closing of the straits was intended to provoke Israel to open war, so that Egypt would have justification to strike the nuclear reactor in Dimona, which explains the need to destroy the Egyptian air force immediately when the war broke out. Furthermore, the development of nuclear weapons was conceived as most important against Egypt, since only a nuclear head would allow to destroy the Aswan Dam. This is an interesting incentive, when one recalls Avigdor Lieberman's remarks in favor of bombing the dam (a threat which its real aftermath was probably not fully understood by most Israelis, as I myself did not understand it previously).

The main difficulty with Ben-Gurion's thesis (of developing nuclear weapons as compensation for other disadvantages Israel has), is that such a development invites a nuclear arm-race. When Israel began developing the reactor in Dimona, there was no non-proliferation treaty, the world was in the midst of the cold war, divided by two nuclear world-powers. It is therefore hard to understand how leaders at the time did not anticipate the scenario Israel is currently facing, even if Iran would not have been the obvious candidate for its role at the time (i.e., such a race would have been more expected with the Egyptians).

The irony, then, is this: Binyamin Netanyahu, for all his acrobatics with words and other difficulties he poses for recognition of a Palestinian state, is presumably turning back the clock, seeking to turn the wheels back to the days of Shamir, on the eve of the Madrid Conference (or immediately thereafter). On the other side, we find the same Shimon Peres who appears in a historical study of Prof. Aronson, and Peres’ successors, of course, who also try to turn back the clock way back, to the days prior to the 1967 war, having the nuclear weapons compensate for Israel’s “narrow waists” after the two-state implementation. In this scenario, the difference between 2017 and 1957 is that in 1957 a nuclear balance of terror could have been foreseeable but was still not in effect; whereas now the full package linking between the fate of the West Bank, the Israeli nuclear power and the whole Middle East is present.

Questions that remain open (at least for me): is this what President Obama is trying to achieve when pushing for the two-state solution, or does he believe he can also divide the land and prevent nuclearization of Iran (and perhaps a de-nuclearization of the whole Middle East)? How does Aronson explain the initial link made by Ben Gurion and his comrades, and what were the causes for the dissociation of the two? Should the opening of the labor market for Palestinians, initiated by Dayan, be understood as a maneuver intended to undermine the goals Alon tried to achieve with the conquest of the West Bank, and if so – in what way?

Aronson, Shlomo. "David Ben-Gurion, Levi Eshkol and the Struggle over Dimona: A Prologue to the Six-Day War and its (Un)Anticipated Results." Israel Affairs 15,2 (2009): 114-134.

Two further references, from Haaretz, in case anyone missed them: Avner Cohen, “Between Natanz and Dimona”; and Reuven Pedatzur, “Here's How Israel Would Destroy Iran's Nuclear Program.”

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A Hebrew version of this post can be found here.

On the Israeli-Palestinian Perspective of Iran's Nuclear Efforts

A. Recognizing What Isn't There

If there is one thing we can be sure about regarding the plans of the Iranian president, Mahmud Ahmedinejad, it is that he has no intentions of obliterating Israel with nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. This certainty is not grounded in the careful reading, dissecting and analyzing of his speeches and their respective translations. I leave that to others. My assumption is that leaders are well-aware of both the legal implication of their words, held to the letter, as well as to the music of their words, which sometimes bears a very different meaning than the strict literal-legal interpretation. In other words, whether president Ahmedinejad ever stated that Israel should be "wiped off the map" or "vanish from the pages of history" bears little significance, politically. The fact is that he is certainly well-aware that most people believe that he stated Israel should be wiped off, and understand this to mean that he wishes to destroy it with WMD. Furthermore, he must definitely realize that many are concerned based on these beliefs and understanding, and that these concerns mar his image in wide international circles. Therefore, rather than allow scholars and commentators to debate the nuances of "wipe off the map" and "vanish from the pages of history" and the various degrees of violence each of these processes might entail, Ahmedinejad could have simply gone to Geneva, for example, and declare that he is appalled that anyone thought he would wish to use WMD to destroy another country, and that Israel has the right to exist as any other nation, his only concern is the situation of human rights in the occupied territories. He did not do that, and therefore whether he meant "wipe off the map" or "vanish from history" is not as crucial as the evident fact, that it must please him to have people interpret or misinterpret him as planning to destroy Israel.

The next step is to realize that had Ahmedinejad really intended to wipe off Israel with one blow, it would be extremely unwise of him to divert such negative attention in the form of these remarks, of conferences espousing holocaust denial, and other provocations. These are all specific actions that make it difficult for Iran to obtain a bomb. A seeming openness to the west accompanied by quasi-liberal statements would have put much less pressure on Iran, and may have enabled it to become a nuclear power more easily.

Is this to mean that explicit aggressive remarks by political leaders should always lead us to believe they mean the exact opposite? Of course not. Various Israeli leaders, from different political camps, have expressed or alluded to the need to attack Iran's nuclear facilities. Here lies the difference: such Israeli remarks might help to furnish the background for a favorable response to such an attack from the international community. Israeli leaders will claim: "we gave ample warning, we asked the world's help and intervention, and only when we saw no sanctions were effective did we choose to strike, at the last minute." Conversely, Iran will not be able to use Ahmedinejad's comments as justification for the actual obliteration of Israel should it happen. Therefore, Israeli comments might point to the wish to attack, while Iranian statements should point to the other direction.

I will not go into depth of analyzing ulterior motives for the Iranian policy, since I know so little about Iranian politics. My provisional comments up to now have all been based on common sense and basic political notions, rather than a knowledge and understanding of Iran's strategy and policy. Suffice it to mention that other than Israel (with which Iran does not share a border, and is hardly affected by it, on any political, economical or other power-struggle level), Iran has several concerns which could prompt it to obtain nuclear power: two of its neighbors, Pakistan and Russia are nuclear powers; Iran resides by the Persian gulf, a source of ongoing conflict (among its neighbors as well as international powers); Iran was in war with Iraq for most of the 1980s, and might wish to put itself in a better position for whatever regime that eventually evolves in Iraq, especially (but not exclusively), if it is a puppet regime of the US; Iran has other interests in the Middle-East (including its connections with Hizbullah, Hamas and Syria), and these might be influenced by how Iran is perceived.

B. Nuclear Weapons and the Palestinians

In the Winograd commission, Shimon Peres described the effects the nuclearization of the Middle East will have on the peace process:

"…Also religious fundamentalism has reawakened, that reminds me of the middle ages. Darkness. And on the other hand, it's against the Arab world, between the Arab Sunni political world, who wants to see the Middle East comprised of Arab states, and between the Persian appetite to impose a religious hegemony on the whole Middle East. Ahmedinejad's ambitions are world-encompassing, and I would really treat him like the Devil, like Hitler. I also think that Israel should say this distinctly. Not to hesitate, as they were in the beginning towards Hitler: you can reason with him, you can this or that – No, you mustn't, we need to lead. We can't lead a military campaign, and we don't need to either, but a psychological campaign we have to lead, because he is actually threatening with the destruction of Israel.
"The question is how do you deal with it, we shouldn't leave the situation as it is, and the way I see it coping with it is twofold. Here I want to say as conclusions: I do not know how long the Middle East will remain without nuclear weapons, probably not a long time, perhaps five years, perhaps ten years. Since we can't prevent the infiltration of nuclear weapons, we need to stop the reasons to attack us, in other words to reach a comprehensive peace soon. There are two options: if we stay in the [occupied] territories, and they will have nuclear weapons, [for] they will have nuclear weapons, I don't know if they'll necessarily throw a nuclear bomb on us, but they will be very obstinate in negotiations. They will have a feeling that eternity is on their side, and we need to be very stern with ourselves. We are playing with the fate of the Jewish people.
"On the other hand, this means doing everything in order to reach peace, I will say in a moment something about that… since this is a ballistic war, a war against terror, it's impossible to run after every 16 year old boy with an F-16 that costs 100 million dollars, eventually they will have anti-aircraft rockets, and they'll drop airplanes, too…
"Anyhow, the experience of the philosophic Israel is how to be big, as big as the danger we are facing, and remain small, as small as the country we have on our side. How to reconcile these two polars, and it's possible. Take Hi-Tech for example. What is Hi-Tech? When we detach from the borders of the land, and the whole global market is our market, with no relation to the Arabs, no relation to nothing…" (from Peres's testimony in the Winograd Commission, Nov. 7, 2006, pp. 9-11. My translation – click here for original).

Peres is mistakenly conceived in Israel and the world as a hero of peace. A laureate of the Nobel Peace Prize, he is considered a visionary of peace, a dreamer who has effortlessly devoted his life for peace. The tone in the Winograd commission, however, where he evidently spoke relatively freely (witnesses did not know in advance their testimonies would be made public), reflects the true essence of his enterprise, as can be seen also from the separationist character of his initiated Oslo Accords: he opposes a military operation against Iran, recognizes that the Palestinians will inevitably obtain nuclear weapons, and that this will make the peace process more difficult. Furthermore, he glorifies Hi-Tech industry, for allowing Israel to be more global, dismissively mentioning "the Arabs." This is the exact opposite of the "New Middle East" vision, which is so much associated with Peres.

The acceptance of WMD in Iranian and Palestinian hands is also surprising when one considers the numerous aggressive statements Peres has made on the matter. This is actually in keeping with what he says in the commission: Israel should lead a psychological campaign, but should refrain from any millitary action to stop it.

Two historical notes to keep in mind: following Peres's short term as Prime-Minister (after Rabin's assassination), Netanyahu rose to power, riding on the raves of criticism on the Oslo Accords. However, he did nothing to turn them over. He continued with the same format of Oslo, making further interim agreements, giving very little actual freedom to Palestinians, very little hope for a statehood, and incessantly expanding the settlements. The one who eventually broke off with the Oslo Accords was Barak, in his term after Netanyahu. To this I add a trivial note, and that is the parallel Peres draws between Ahmedinejad and Hitler, a personal favorite's of Netanyahu, and a parallel that is displeasing to left wing factions in Israel.

In an interview last week, Ehud Barak sounded hesitant regarding the possibility of an operation in Iran. He did not oppose it or dismiss it, but contrasted it with the operation in Iraq in 1981, explaining the differences. He then went on to a paragraph that for some reason did not appear in the English edition of Haaretz (original Hebrew here):

"The problem is that if Iran continues to make progress towards nuclear weapons without being stopped, it will bring a breach of all international barriers, and then we will enter a process of a nuclear arm-race, because Egypt and Turkey will not be able to stand by, and neither will Saudi-Arabia. And then we will enter a reality that within 10-15 years nuclear material will be in the hands of a terrorist group that will attack in New York, Antwerp or Ashdod. Suppose the world will manage in a coordinated operation of the US, Russia and China to initiate a Kaddafization of the ayatollahs, although a still don't see that that is going to happen. So what? Is the world an ideal world? No. There's Pakistan, which is the main nightmare, and there are other problems."

C. Conclusions

What the Iranians wish to gain by becoming a nuclear power I do not understand. That they do not pose an immediate threat to Israel (certainly not in the form of a nuclear attack) should be evident.

The significance of nuclearization of the Middle East conflict is that it introduces new tools to perpetuate an old conflict. The Cold War was one tool, the refusal to compromise the land (both by Israeli and Arab parties) was another. To a certain degree it has worn out. Not entirely, but more and more Israelis find it difficult to argue against any withdrawal in return for peace. Likewise, more and more Palestinians have abandoned the dream of a full Palestinian state.

Nuclear weapons in hands of old enemies (Syrians, Palestinians, Lebanese) means new things to negotiate, new things to find hard to give up. In the words of Shimon Peres, it will introduce "eternity" into negotiations. "Eternity" has played a role in both the conflict and the negotiations on its resolution in the past. But nuclear power provides for a new eternity, one of the apocalyptic kind.

Time plays an interesting role in the above quoted analysis by Peres: while negotiating, nuclear weapons introduce "eternity". Hence, Peres argues, an agreement should be reached before they acquire the weapons. But if the agreement is reached before they acquire nuclear power, does that not imply that the neighboring Palestinian state will have such weapons? Is such a scenario reassuring? Surely a peaceful neighboring state can become hostile.

This is the kind of peace envisioned by the separationists: one that is sustained by a nuclear umbrella and a balance of terror. Then there is no hope (or danger, depending on your politics), that Israelis and Palestinians will do business and be friendly neighbors. Instead, Israelis will go to the global market, "with no relation to the Arabs, no relation to nothing."


D. Postscript – the Israeli attack

What are the chances for an attack, and what will it achieve?

An attack on Iran, if anything, will stall the Iranian nuclear program, not stop it. Such a preemptive strike will be used by Iran to portray itself as the victim of aggression, not the initiator of it. It will then justify Iran's claim that it has to protect itself from the only nuclear power in the Middle East. In other words, an Israeli attack on Iran can ironically be used to substantiate the need for a balance of terror, rather than diffuse the balance.

The main questions when examining the purpose of an Israeli strike on Iran and its aftermath are therefore two: (1) how much time will such a strike buy? (2) what will be done in this time?

If the strike buys little time for change (less than two years), it can only serve to accelerate the efforts and substantiate the need for a balance of terror. If it buys more time, it can either be accompanied by further harsh rhetoric (back to the balance of terror), or can be accompanied with conciliatory efforts (trying to change the whole course of history in the Middle East).

Israel has very little ways of influencing Iranian politics, and while the US has more to offer, it does not necessarily have something to offer that the Iranians are interested in obtaining. At the same time, Israel has also very little to threat the Iranians with, including a nuclear war, which will always be more devastating to Israel than to Iran. But the little power it has should be diverted to dialogue and integration in the region, rather than seclusion and separation, with its back to the Middle East, and its face to the west. After all, we shouldn't be playing with the fate of the Jewish people.

On Netanyahu's Demand for Recognition

One of Benjamin Netanyahu's legacies in his first term as prime-minister was his demand for "reciprocality" (hadadiyut), saying he will not make any concessions for the Palestinians before they demonstrate that they're filling their part of previous agreements.

Such a demand leads to a magic-circle contradiction: if Israel doesn't fill its share until the Palestinian fill their share, then both sides are in a mutual breach of the agreement, and any step towards the agreement would create another imbalance. This is a sure recipe for stagnation.

The demand from the Palestinians is especially out of place, since the status quo is in itself imbalanced, and in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict alone, it is imbalanced for the Israelis advantage. It is therefore right to ask Israel to make more concessions than the Palestinians, and to start doing so before them. Despite the wrong premise of Netanyahu's policy, his oft-repeated catchphrase "yitnu-yeqablu" (literally: "if they will give – they will receive; if they don't give – they won't receive") has become identified with him and with his approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

It is therefore ironic that his first step towards the Palestinians in his second term as prime-minister is to demand a one-sided recognition by the Palestinians of Israel as a Jewish State. The Americans have put pressure on Netanyahu who has since retracted this as a demand, supposedly claiming that it was not a demand, but merely an observation regarding the obstacles ahead.

Too bad. It would have been interesting to see Netanyahu's demand coupled with a reciprocal Palestinian demand. I jotted down on my Hebrew blog several sample statements that could have made Netanyahu realize how foolish this prerequisite was. Suppose that following Netanyahu's statement, the Palestinians would have agreed to acknowledge Israel as a Jewish State, providing that this recognition would be incorporated in the following joint statement:

"Both sides recognize Israel as the Jewish State, and future Palestine as the Palestinian State. Therefore, both states will live side by side with equal rights. These rights include sovereignty, maintaining an army and use of airspace. Neither country will try to impair the other country's sovereignty, for example by trying to affect or prohibit the entrance of people or goods."

Or:

"Both sides recognize the historical right the Jewish people have to the Holy Land, just as the Palestinian people have a right to it. Just as the promised land to Abraham extends far beyond the political borders of Israel, so does the Palestinian homeland extend beyond Gaza and the West Bank. Hence, the peace process will not focus on historical rights, but on the political conditions for coexistence of Jews and Palestinians."

Or, imagine a more dissenting response:

"Following the request of Premier Netanyahu, we acknowledge Israel as the state of the Jewish people. It is therefore ironic that from the time of its establishment in 1948 and until the early 1990s, most buildings in this Jewish state were constructed by Palestinian workers. The abuse of the political situation to gain from underpaid labor with no social benefits allowed the prosperity of the Jewish state. A major purpose of the negotiations will be to find the right way for Israel, as the Jewish State, to compensate Palestine, as the Palestinian state for years of unrewarding labor."

The simplest response, of course, would be to use Netanyahu's demand in order to remind him of the legal foundation for regarding Israel as a Jewish state in international law:

"In this negotiation, both sides will strive to establish two states, Jewish and Palestinian, living peacefully side by side, according to UN resolution 181, of November 29, 1947."

Any of these responses would have quickly made Netanyahu regret his demand, and would expose it to be the ridiculous, impertinent proposal it is. The Palestinian refusal to respond to Netanyahu's demand with a counter-demand is too bad. As I wrote this in my Hebrew blog, I recalled the Palestinian refusal to present a counter-offer to Ehud Barak's offer in Camp David. A reader responded that the Palestinians have consistently avoided presenting counter-offers or counter-demands ever since the days of Oslo. There is definitely a power in avoiding counter-proposals that escapes me. I am much more fascinated by the power of presenting a counter-proposal.

The Palestinian refusal serves to portray them in Israeli eyes as those who have still not reconciled with a Jewish existence in the Middle East. In the background there is the issue of the Right of Return, as well as the rights of the Palestinian minority living in Israel proper, excluded from these negotiations (and any peace process).

This is bad news, since instead of exposing the Israeli government as one which is interested in perpetuating the occupation (a very simple task, as a matter of fact), the Palestinians will justify Netanyahu's stance of caution as the negotiations proceed. This is not too different from what happened in Camp David, when both Arafat and Barak benefited from the portrayal of Arafat as the obstacle for peace.

American pressure cannot bring peace alone, and certainly cannot stop the disenfranchisement of basic human rights from Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza.

The Two-State Myth

I was working on a handy list of Middle East myths concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, when I realized that one of the myths gaining popularity recently is the “Netanyahu opposes the Two-State solution” myth, and that led me to think of the two-state myth on the most basic level.

Regarding Netanyahu, Tzipi Livni definitely had her success with spreading this myth. Somehow this thought seems to console people. In Netanyahu's previous run, he had tough rhetoric, but at the same time couldn't stop reiterating that he was committed to previous agreements, and above all the Oslo accords. Then, there was a series of Prime-Ministers who openly opposed occupation (Barak, Sharon, Olmert), but did nothing in the direction of ending it. So finally we're back to the pre-Intifada eighties, with a Prime-Minister that supposedly opposes the two-state, and we can attack him openly on that.

I don't know how much Netanyahu is against the two-state, but I know for sure that Livni is not in favor of a full Palestinian state. Very few are, for that matter. As a case-study, I took the Genva Accord as a model for the two-state solution. Here are some of the principles of the initiative:

- Major settlements will be annexed to Israel. The main implication of this is that the majority of settlers will not be evacuated from their homes.
- The corridor connecting the two parts of Palestine (West Bank and Gaza strip) will be under complete Israeli control.
- No armed forces for Palestine (exclusions for law-keeping forces are provided)
- Palestine shall be a non-militarized state
- limitations on the weapons that may be purchased, owned, used or manufactured in Palestine shall be specified in an annex to the final agreement.
- No individuals may purchase, possess, carry or use weapons
- A Multinational force will be deployed to Palestine
- Israel will maintain a small military presence in the Jordan Valley (i.e., in Palestine)
- Israel may maintain two Early Warning Stations in the northern and central West Bank
- The Israeli Air Force shall be entitled to use the Palestinian sovereign airspace for training purposes
- Multinational Force representatives will have the authority to block the entry into Palestine of any weapons, materials or equipment that are in contravention of the provisions of the agreement.
- In passenger terminals, for thirty months, Israel may maintain an unseen presence in a designated on-site facility
- In cargo terminals, for thirty months, Israel may maintain an unseen presence in a designated on-site facility
- Regulations concerning the Temple Mount compound consist of 430 words. The reciprocal statute on the Wailing Wall has only eight: "The Wailing Wall shall be under Israeli sovereignty."
- Along the way outlined in Map X (from the Jaffa Gate to the Zion Gate) there will be permanent and guaranteed arrangements for Israelis regarding access, freedom of movement, and security (this is in an area that should be Palestinian)
- the Jewish Cemetery on the Mount of Olives shall be under Israeli administration
- The Western Wall Tunnel shall be under Israeli administration
- Palestinian Jerusalemites who currently are permanent residents of Israel shall lose this status
- Return of refugees to Israel shall be at the sovereign discretion of Israel
- The value of the Israeli fixed assets that shall remain intact in former settlements and transferred to the state of Palestine will be deducted from Israel’s contribution to the International Fund of the refugees.
- arrangements for Israeli civilian use will apply to designated roads in Palestine as detailed in Map X (Road 443, Jerusalem to Tiberias via Jordan Valley, and Jerusalem –Ein Gedi). The designated roads will be patrolled by the Multinational Forces at all times.
- Access guarantee to agreed sites of religious significance, including the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron and Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem, and Nabi Samuel.


In short, there are supposedly two independent states, only one is more independent than the other. In numerous articles of the agreement, Israel is privileged. Israelis are privileged. They are secured access to religious sites in Palestine, they are secured access to civilian roads (for no apparent reason other than convenience), and they get to keep military presence in Palestine (Jordan valley, Old City and all border passages).

Israel controls the unity of the Palestinian state, by being the sovereign of the corridor. Israel is sovereign to decide how many Palestinians will return. No reciprocity. Israel will deduct the value of the settlements from the compensation it pays refugees. No reciprocal talk of compensation for cheap Palestinian labor under which these settlements were built, and which are responsible for many Israeli constructions.

Jerusalem Palestinians lose their entitlements in Israel, but Israelis can still wander freely between Jaffa Gate and Zion Gate. No reciprocal arrangements are made. Israelis use civilian roads in Palestine for their convenience, travel on shuttles to religious sites, but Palestinians cannot travel freely to Israel.

And so on, and so forth. This is the two-state solution that people are looking forward to, and that are appalled that Netanyahu opposes. Here are the names of some of the major proponents of this agreement:

In Israel: Colette Avital, Uzi Baram, Yossi Beilin, Avraham Burg, Naomi Chazan, Tzvia Greenfeld, David Grossman, Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, Amram Mitzna, Haim Oron, Amos Oz, Ophir Pines-Paz, Dalia Rabin, Mossi Raz, Zeev Sternhell, Yuli Tamir, Avshalom Vilan, Einat Wilf, Avraham B. Yehoshua.

This is the core of the Israeli left, Authors, Labor and Meretz, past leaders of the Peace Now movement, and all they can come up with is this miserable, weakened version of a state for Palestinians. As if any Palestinian would feel pride, a return to the homeland, a resurrection of the crushed body and spirit from 1948.

If the Oslo Accords could be seen as a compromise, hoping they would get more at the final agreement, the Geneva Accord is a final agreement requiring the end of mutual claims. Despite the many concessions Palestinians are required to make in this agreement for Israelis, there were still Palestinians who signed it. Among them:

Yasser Abd-Rabbo, Hisham Abdel-Razek, Sufian abu-Zaydeh, Ashraf al-Ajrami, Kadura Fares, Nazmi al-Jubeh, Nabil Kassis, Jibril Rajoub, Salim Tamari, Jamal Zakout.

Some of them have since openly expressed their support in a one-state solution (although they all still appear on the Geneva Accord website, and I don’t know if they officially retracted their support of it, or merely supplemented it with a call for a one-state).

Perhaps some will think that my criticism is irrelevant in light of Netanyahu. If the two-state version of the Israeli left is so bad, and Netanyahu isn’t willing to hear about it, then he is really right-wing. But this is exactly where the myth is dangerous: Netanyahu is being criticized for not believing in the two-state solution, as if other Israelis do believe in it. And perhaps it is better to have someone who opposes the solution in its current version?

I am no proponent of Netanyahu, but I am more concerned with people who think the two-state solution offers any prospect of equality, hope, or national aspirations for the Palestinians.

Netanyahu is not half as dangerous as the Geneva gang. At least no-one has expectations from him. The criticism he is facing from Europe and the US, only serves to strengthen the Geneva supporters. And that’s bad news for everyone.

Understanding Lieberman

J-street's recent survey of approaches to US Middle East Policy reflects, perhaps unsurprisingly, two notions that are at the core of its activity: (a) that the US should be more involved and put more pressure in reaching a solution; and (b) that the two-state solution is the preferable model for peace in the Middle East. Not only do I reject these two notions individually, but I think their combination can be hazardous on a practical level, in addition to them being alien to the fundamental elements of peace: solving the current situation rather than atoning for the past; dialogue; taking into account the fears, needs and aspirations of each side.

I have written a fair deal on the two-state, and on the futility of international pressure on the peace process, and leave those aside for now. I wish to focus on the issue of Avigdor Lieberman in the survey. According to J-Street’s own admission, they pollsters misrepresented Lieberman’s case, and they were wise to do so, since it apparently generated the desired response.

Before I proceed to analyze Lieberman’s stance and its misrepresentation, an important clarification is in place: when arguing that Lieberman’s views are not the apartheidist or kahanist views they are said to be, I am not seeking to defend Lieberman. I am definitely not a supporter of him. However, journalists and pundits tend to be deceived by harsh rhetoric, and thus misinterpret events. All I am seeking for is understanding. Remember Menachem Begin: his rise to power in Israel (1977) was received with hysteria not too different from current attitude towards Lieberman. He then astonished his critics with the peace accord with Egypt, for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize for peace (1978). Few expected, then, that the Nobel Peace laureate would launch an unprovoked offensive on Iraq (1981), which received harsh criticism from the world (strike 1), the invasion to Lebanon (strike 2), including the massacre in Sabra and Shatila (strike 3 and out).

Of course one should hold a value-based stance towards politics. But the analysis of politicians should first be engaged with understanding their true motives, ideology and actions, and only then to be followed with a value-based critique.

Quoting from J-Street’s summary of the survey:

On Avigdor Lieberman: When told about Lieberman's campaign platform requiring Arab citizens of Israel to sign loyalty oaths, as well as his threats against Arab Members of Knesset, American Jews opposed these positions by a 69 to 31 margin. One in three believe their own connection to Israel will be diminished if Lieberman assumes a senior position in the Israeli cabinet.

Lieberman led a very aggressive and racist campaign in the past elections, although his policies are quite different from his rhetoric. This will be better examined now that he becomes a member of cabinet, but the time he served in the government of Olmert was enough proof of that. No one knows that better than the outlawed Kach movement (founded by Meir Kahane), who publicized Lieberman’s past membership during the election campaign, in what was a clear Bear Hug – there was no danger that Kach supporters would vote for Lieberman, but Kach leaders were well-aware that such information would be a cause for embarrassment for Lieberman, and might deter some from supporting him.

Lieberman never proposed to specifically require loyalty oaths from Arab citizens. Such a demand would indeed be racist, undemocratic, and therefore impossible to pass in Israeli parliament. Lieberman knows this all too well. He supports such a loyalty oath for all citizens. The thing is, that everyone knows that the first to refuse to declare such loyalty, and perhaps to stage an indignant counteraction will be the Palestinians who are citizens of Israel.

It should be mentioned, at this point, that Israel requires every citizen of age 16 and above to carry an official ID at all times. For many westerners, this is a very foreign notion perhaps even undemocratic. Sure, it will be pretty hard to get by in the US without an ID: opening a bank account, driving a car, getting a credit card, leaving the country – all these and more require an ID. But theoretically, one can live in the US without an ID, and one certainly does not have to carry it at all times. In Israel, even if one manages to live without a bank account, without a car or a driver’s license, and without leaving the country, one still has to have his ID with him. A passport or driver’s license won’t do – one has to carry the special identification document.

Another fact that should be mentioned: for most Israeli citizens are there is a mandatory military service (excluding Palestinians and yeshiva-students). Upon enlistment, the soldier is required to sign a written loyalty oath, vowing to be loyal to Israel and the IDF, obeying all orders and explicitly expressing a will to die for the IDF.

This is a loyalty oath that the majority of Israeli population accept at the age of 18, upon enlistment. Palestinians with Israeli citizenship are not required to do army service, and hence are not required to take the oath.

Under these circumstances, Lieberman’s suggestion is not too far from the situation in Israel: in addition to the mandatory ID and the mandatory oath of the IDF, citizens coming to file an application for their ID (their mandatory ID), will be asked, upon application to sign a loyalty oath.

Of course, if J-Street would have worded it thus, few would have found Lieberman’s proposal so abhorrent (although they might have been surprised to find how far Israel is from the democracy they idealize): When told about Lieberman’s suggestion to add to the mandatory application for the ID at the age of 16 a brief segment addressing a loyalty-to-Israel oath, which would not be phrased as harsh as the IDF oath that most Israelis take a mere two years after their ID application, American Jews… It would be interesting how such a more accurate phrasing of the situation would fail to yield the anti-Lieberman sentiment J-Street was seeking.

To be sure, J-Street is not the first, nor the last to misrepresent views of its opponents to argue their case better. Lieberman himself misrepresented his own views during the campaign in order to steal right-wing racist votes and place them with someone who is much more of a pragmatist than his speech. One cannot underestimate Lieberman’s support of the two-state solution, especially his support for land-swap, including land that was under Israel sovereignty since 1948 as Umm el-Fahm. Under the guise of racist rhetoric (“we don’t want you here”), Lieberman has been advocating something that few from the left are willing to consider – that the Palestinian state should include as much Palestinian land and Palestinian people as is geographically possible, rather than making the happenstance 1967 lines sacred. This, in addition to Lieberman’s statement that he would be willing to evacuate from his own home in settlement Nokdim in light of a peace agreement explain why Kach leaders wanted to embarrass him, and explains how Lieberman can sit in an Olmert government as well as with Ehud Barak.

Much more will be said about Lieberman and his policies as more data comes in. For the time being, J-Street would do a better service by working out a realistic understanding of the various factions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, rather than cementing old and useless stereotypes. Those might make one feel more righteous in its cause, but ultimately lead to obfuscation and confusion.

Discussions of the J-Street Survey (not the Lieberman point) can be found on Realistic Dove, and on Anthony Loewenstein’s blog.

Netanyahu's Government and Some Methodological Issues

The TV scientist who mutters sadly, "The experiment is a failure; we have failed to achieve what we had hoped for," is suffering mainly from a bad scriptwriter. An experiment is never a failure solely because it fails to achieve predicted results. An experiment is a failure only when it also fails adequately to test the hypothesis in question, when the data it produces don't prove anything one way or another.

- Robert M. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance II,9 (in my Bantam 1981 edition it is on page 95. I have no idea how canonized that is).

I love this quote, and like to keep it in mind in my research, although research in Humanities is obviously nothing like the Natural Sciences. There is no experiment that can prove you right or wrong. The most you can hope for is the accidental discovery, and those are very rare. But it is still a helpful quote, methodologically speaking. I use it for reassurance when I need to admit that I went out looking to prove some thesis, but the evidence didn’t support it. It often feels sheepish to say “uh, I don’t know,” but sometimes it is more truthful than trying to advance a hypothesis that you know won’t work, no matter how badly you wanted it to.

This is true for political analysis, as well, although analyzing politics is again different from either Natural Sciences or the Humanities. Politicians’ words are data, and their actions are even more important data. That means that new data keeps coming in, each piece subject to more than one possible direction for interpretation.

Unlike the Natural Sciences but similar to Humanities, there is no test you can subject your analysis to, which will unequivocally prove you right or wrong. Unlike the humanities, you keep getting more information.

The important thing, which most pundits and commentators do not do, is to admit you were wrong. Here is where the Pirsig quote becomes helpful. Admission of error of a previous political analysis can be a further step in understanding, if you manage to formulate properly what you expected from the politician, where you thought he or she were leading to, and where they obviously are not. Based on this new data, you can navigate slightly better in this shaky business. Two of my repeated examples are also two of my repeated mistakes:

All through 1999-2000, I couldn’t figure out how Ehud Barak was so clumsy in his conduct of peace talks with the Syrians and then the Palestinians. I didn’t understand how he could be such a stupid negotiator. When the violence broke out in October 2000 and Barak didn’t even seem surprised, that was the queue to change my direction, and starting to view the whole process in a completely new light: the pullout from Lebanon, Shepherdstown, Camp David – everything.

Again, in July 2006, when Olmert went to war with Hizbullah, I supported it, assuming that like myself, Olmert wanted to change things with Hizbullah foundationally, and weaken it. The seeming clumsiness of the war was somewhat disappointing, but only after the end of the war, and the quotes from Olmert’s testimony at the Winograd committee did things start to come together (eventually leading me to write my first post – not first published, but first written).

I was thinking about all this as commentators in Israeli media are struggling to understand Netanyahu’s negotiations for a coalition. Several have mocked him for making the mistake of giving in to Avigdor Lieberman too easily. But this would seem a mistake on behalf of the commentators, not by Netanyahu.

Before the elections took place, I wrote that I see Netanyahu, Lieberman and Tzipi Livni as a possible axis of allies, rather than contenders. After the elections results, I made the mistake of thinking that the government was going to be a unity government of Likkud, Kadima and Labour (or alternatively of Likkud, Kadima and Lieberman’s Israel Beitenu).

The fact that things haven’t turned out that way might be a sign that there is no tri-axis as I perceived it, although this remains open. Livni might have tactical reasons to stay out of the government, and still be ideologically close to Netanyahu. It might also be beneficial to have control of both the coalition and the opposition, even if they are actually close to each other.

Anyway, I don’t think there’s a reason to see Netanyahu as clumsily giving in to Lieberman. Especially since the issues in which he has “given in” clearly work for his benefit: Dan Meridor might be leaving (so soon?) as a response to Lieberman’s demand to give Daniel Friedman another term as Minister of Justice; rumor has it that Benny Begin might join him; Silvan Shalom will not have one of the three major offices (defense, treasury, foreign office), and Netanyahu is free to blame Lieberman for that, instead of explicitly stating that he wants to keep Shalom away from power.

Shalom would obviously see through such a trick, so the question is why isn’t he fighting harder. If indeed he accepts a more minor office, it will be an indication that he lacks the political power to force Netanyahu into giving him something more important. According to the papers, Netanyahu is keeping the treasury for himself. If this is true, it will be quite obvious that he had something to offer Shalom, and didn’t want to. Shalom is aware that if he quits as a result, Netanyahu will easily replace him by members of Kadima (who are already contemplating a return to Likkud), and will have some interesting propositions to make to them (including the treasury). This might be the real reason that Netanyahu doesn’t want to place the treasury in someone else’s hand. On the other hand, if this were the reason, would it not make more sense to keep the Defense Office vacant, as a gleaming jewel for Shaul Mofaz? Perhaps. And perhaps at this point, and following Winograd, Netanyahu knows he will have a hard time appointing a non-general as the Defense Minister, especially after losing Ehud Barak, for inner-politics of the Labor party.

All these are guesses, of course, based on current information (and possibly some disinformation). It is stupid of me to publish it really. Who knows if Netanyahu won’t present a completely different government in the end? Then it will be back to the drawing board again.

Like You Mean It

The gap between form and content is the politician's goldmine. Media representations find it difficult to address the difference between form and content, in a way that brings them to focus solely on the form. This is despite the fact that most human beings sense this gap quite instinctively from a very early stage.

Say you're sorry. I don't want to. Say it anyway. So you push your lip down, lower your voice, and mutter: "I'm sorry". No, that doesn't count. Say it again, nicely. Say it like you mean it. But I don't mean it. I can't say it like I mean it. I know it doesn't count, that's why I said it that way.

These are complex maneuvers, but children relate to them quite easily: the content is supposedly the words "I'm sorry", while the form is how the words are being said. But at times this can be reversed, and the way you say it becomes important because it conveys that you are actually saying something different than your words. The "content" (the words "I'm sorry") thus becomes the form, and the real content is conveyed by intonation. This is a clever move, and most children would probably not be able to explain what they did, and would be quite reluctant to analyze it as I've just done. But nevertheless it comes quite natural to them.

The IDF's announcement that it will take off almost thirty checkpoints in the West Bank poses this kind of gap between form and content. I have been calling for the demolition of the Separation Wall and for the removal of checkpoints for some time now, yet I find it hard to congratulate the IDF for this decision. First of all, human rights should not be in military hands. The government is responsible for securing the rights of the Palestinians, and any military need to withhold such rights should be carefully scrutinized, temporary, and it is up to the Israeli government to see that these rights are placed back as soon as the immediate military need is over. So, the first thing I feel is regret that such an announcement comes out by the IDF bulletin.

More importantly, of course, is the fact that just as a child can say he is sorry with a frown that will make it clear he regrets rien, it is also possible to take off checkpoints and still withhold basic rights as freedom of movement. The disengagement from Gaza should have taught that much: for years left-wingers have been claiming that the Jewish settlements are an obstacle for peace and are the reason for the continuing disenfranchisement of Palestinians. Ariel Sharon proved that he can remove all the settlements in the Gaza strip quite easily, and still withhold rights from the people of Gaza. It was obvious that this was going to be the outcome before the plan, and it is therefore lamentable that there were not more left-wing people opposing the plan itself.

Improving on "occupation without settlements", Israel now proceeds to "occupation without checkpoints". "Without" is a little harsh, of course. 29 of the 41 checkpoints are going to be removed. "Removed" is a little exaggerated, too: the checkpoints that are removed will allow free passage to vehicles at daytime, and prohibit pedestrian passage. At nighttime, no one will be allowed to pass through the "removed checkpoints," except on special "humanitarian" cases, that will require an officer to physically arrive at the gate of the "removed checkpoint" and judge whether this "humanitarian" case is sever enough.

If I've already pointed out some of the misnomers used for this new plan, perhaps it is useful to mock the usage of "humanitarian" in the discourse of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is quite ironic that "humanitarian" refers to animalistic needs of survival (food, water and urgent care) whereas everything that is beyond that is discarded is not essential for humanitarian causes. As our bodily needs are not what distinguishes us from animals, but rather what unites us with them, I find the categorization of these needs under "humanitarian causes" to be tragically amusing, in a bitter sort of way. For me, the freedom of education, and of occupation and even the simple right to take a stroll is much more of a humanitarian cause than making sure that seriously ill people get to hospital. I suppose that saying that Israel will allow passage for "animalistic needs" or for "beastly causes" simply does not sound as good as "humanitarian".

Thus, the removal of checkpoints is noting more than a cosmetic change. No doubt, it will be used for PR purposes, and will hear plenty of speakers of Israel boasting that Israel has removed 70% of the checkpoints in order to alleviate Palestinian strife.

It is now the role of the left not to confuse the form it has been opposing (the checkpoints) with the cause (freedom of movement). It is now time to say to the government of Israel: that doesn't count, do it like you mean it