Understanding Politics: Between Analysis, Interpretation and Valuation

A series of recent posts on my Hebrew blog entailed a discussion on the interpretation of politicians and their actions. This is known to be a favorite topic of mine, so I decided to add something about it on my English blog, as well.

The main problem that looms under any political analysis is the entangled relationship between understanding and values. Politics, after all, is about values, so it is practically impossible to make a positive statement about any political move, without attaching to it at least some degree of judgment and valuation. Perhaps, this is true of any statement in life.

The problem begins if one wishes to assess any given political move analytically regardless of ideology, but the proper assessment in itself is – and can be nothing but – the product of valuation.

As an example, let's take Netanyahu's Bar-Ilan's speech of last summer. Most analyses of this speech would follow of one two options: (a) Netanyahu sincerely wants a two-state solution, as stated in his speech; or (b) these are only words, Netanyahu does not really want a two-state solution.

Most commentators would then proceed to make a valuative-statement regarding either of their analyses. Thus, the two hypothetical responses could also be divided into at least four hypothetical statements: (a.1) Netanyahu wants a two-state solution and this is good, because that indeed is the best solution of the conflict; (a.2) Netanyahu wants a two-state solution, and this is bad, because a two-state solution is a danger to Israel; (b.1) these are only words, which is a shame, because the two-state solution is a good idea; and, finally, (b.2) these are only words, Netanyahu knows very well that a Palestinian state will pose an existential threat to Israel.

Just to complicate things a little, I'll add that of course we don't have to stop there. We can also have people who oppose the two-state solution without thinking the two-state solution would be danger to Israel (such as myself). This would be something like (a.3) Netanyahu wants a two-state solution, which is too bad, because that's the wrong solution for the conflict; or (b.3) Netanyahu doesn't really want a two-state solution, but he actually doesn't want any peaceful solution, so this argument is futile. We could also imagine an (a.1) type who is politically committed to taunting Netanyahu. This would be something like (a.1.α): "Netanyahu has finally realized that the two-state solution is the right path for Israel. I wish I could greet him, but I feel it's too late and too little, and he's not the right person to lead, even though he outlined the right path for Israeli policy in his speech."

I'm putting those for aside now, and going back to the original four prototypes. So, I'm imagining four hypothetical people, two who oppose the two-state solution and two who support it, and each pair disagrees on the meaning of this speech. This situation could prove that political analysis is separate from one's own political views, because the agreement on the political analysis does not correlate with the agreement on the political ideology.

But here lies the problem: each and every one of these views has made a series of assumptions, valuative choices, and based on his political ideology and values, has reached certain conclusions, all of which underlie his discourse, but will hardly ever surface. The fact of the matter is, we have no time to uncover and discuss all of these tacit assumptions.

Here is an example of a few of them: a.1 and b.1 assume that the two-state solution is a good thing. This is over-simplified, but we're going to leave it that way, for the sake of discussion (what is good? Good for whom? Is it good because it will bring peace, or is it good because it will improve Israel's stance in the next stage of the conflict? Etc.) So, if they think that it is a good thing, they can either assume that its goodness is evident to all, including Netanyahu, or that its goodness is disputable. Either of these assumptions is not only based on other sets of assumptions (the quality of the solution, the mental capacities of political subjects, opponents, etc.), but also entails further assumptions and hermeneutic choices to be made. For example, if the goodness of the two-state solution is taken to be "self-evident," as it were, then one is compelled to explain the reasons Netanyahu opposed to it up to now. Even without accounting for the previous stance, some assumption is going to be made regarding the change in Netanyahu's stance which will inherently bear implications regarding his previous stance. These can range from the psychological, to the international-political, the internal-political, etc.

The frustrating thing is, that my whole discussion up to now, is also trapped within a valuative interpretation. Because there are those who consider politicians to be self-centered, power-addicted, short-sighted hypocrites, who couldn't care less about their policies, and who actually have very little control over them (note that the last two are very two different kinds of arguments). Such a view would therefore consider my whole enterprise of analyzing politicians ideologically as futile. This opposing view is not devoid of ideology, of course. It, too, also makes assumptions regarding the nature of humans, the nature of politics, etc.

And this, of course, is only a sampling of the range of possible views. I haven't even started to try and aptly represent any opposing view that came on my Hebrew blog (it would also be unfair, of course, precisely due to what I'm trying to say here).

We have words of politicians and actions. Those are facts, but both are open to interpretation: did he say this because he believed it, because he was pressured to say it, or because he tried to achieve something completely different, not necessarily explicitly related to the content of the speech? Did he do, or refrain from action, because he wanted to, because he couldn't do it, because he was forced to, because he tried to do something else and it didn't come out the way he wanted? I have said more than once that the true understanding of politics lies in the gap between a politician's words and his deeds. Now I understand that any element of these is open to interpretation, so that even a stark discrepancy between words and deeds requires a careful examination, trying to assess whether either or both of these elements were "authentic" or the product of the clash or combination of many other forces. The primacy of the deed over word is still clear to me, but the understanding of the deed is doubtful.

Above all, I am trapped, and always will be trapped, in the way I would like things to be done, the way I think, and that I inevitably assume that others think as well. Therefore, my understanding of deeds, and lack thereof, is more limited than I would like to believe. I write this as a vain note of caution for myself in the future.

Against the Fear of Balcanization

The question is not whether time is running out on a two-state solution, as if one state, like South Africa, could ever happen here. The real question is whether we are going to prevent the kind of general violence that will turn Israel and Palestine into a Balkans-style conflict, with Jerusalem a kind of Sarajevo, and the Israeli Arab villages of the Little Triangle a kind of Bosnia. Without palpable outside action to move Israel off the status quo, especially from the Obama administration, the streets of the West Bank will blow. But Obama has no desire to pick a fight with any senators just now, not until 60 of them vote to end the inevitable Republican filibuster.

- Bernard Avishai, "What Can Obama Do About Palestine, Meanwhile?" Bernard Avishai Dot Com, November 8, 2009.

 

I wrote against the usage of Bosnia imagery a year ago, in light of the Acre riots after Yom Kippur (in Hebrew). The fallacy of both "fears" – South Africa and the Balcans – is in its attempt to frame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the consequences of the 1967 war.

But anyone with substantial knowledge of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its history – and Avishai is definitely such a knowledgeable author – must recognize that the conflict did not begin in 1967, and that its solution, therefore, cannot be framed within the 1967 borders.

Israel and its supporters know very well the benefits of such discourse: the 1949 armistice agreements gave Israel more than the UN designated borders of Israel in resolution 181. Thus, although some of the main arguments against Israel, against the settlements and for the two-state solution are grounded in international law and international recognition, the partition line never follows the internationally accepted line by agreement, but one that was obtained by violence.

"We are not South Africa, we are not the Balcans" is the chant we keep hearing, but beneath it lies a severe state of denial: "we don't want to be South Africa, we don't want to be the balcans."

Well, here is the truth of it: we are the balcans. Palestine was never two separate smudges on a map, divided by a series of Jewish settlement blots. Its western border was always the Mediterranean, and not only in Gaza.

We can play games, put the Palestinians behind a wall or a fence, and claim: "now we're two neighboring states". But even after that happens, there will still be Palestinians in Israel, there will still be demands for the implementation of 181 and 194, there will still be Palestinians who want not only their political rights but a cultural representation, one that cannot and will not be found in a Hebrew Republic.

If that day ever arrives, I will wonder what excuse the Israeli left and the pro-Israel Americans will have to explain the ever-growing similarity to the Balcans.

I oppose the notion that time is running out. I have written quite a bit about the dimension of time in the conflict in Hebrew, and perhaps will write more about it here in the future (time-permitting…). But the real question is not at all, as Avishai frames it, " whether we are going to prevent the kind of general violence that will turn Israel and Palestine into a Balkans-style conflict." Anyone with integrity would have to admit that after 100 years of a bleeding history, we are way beyond that. Despite the European dream of early Zionists, we are, indeed in a general, on-going, no-end-in-sight, conflict. No need for a newsflash to realize this.

Rather than denying it, we need to think of ways to regulate this conflict, so that in between the waves of violence, we can offer the highest degree possible of "a normal life" and of maintenance of human rights for all. Such regulation and management will also include mechanisms to contain and defer, as much as possible, future violence. But in no way should we delude ourselves that there is a clear, simple solution, that will put an end to it once and for all, as if this wasn't the Balcans.

More accurately, even, I will phrase it as follows: no, this is not the Balcans or South Africa. This is the Middle East. And there is no reason to think that Mideast implies anything less horrific or less complicated that the Balcans. It implies precisely that.

Forming a Position on US Engagement with Iran

So, if I didn't like Fareed Zakaria's piece on US relation to Iran's efforts to obtain nuclear power, which is it going to be: (1) military strike; (2) diplomatic engagement; or (3) contain and deter?

Methodology

Posing the question in the framework set by Zakaria, immediately sends me back to realizing the discrepancy between Form and Content. The widely-accepted parallel between form and content, would consider the first option to be that of a hawk, the second and third to be those of a dove. For me, before asking whether or not to strike Iran, there is a higher question of strategy founded on ethics: what kind of Middle-East (or world) do we want, and what is the right way to get there?

After all, arguing against a strike, for example, could set someone in a dogmatic position, that would beset his own beliefs and will. We can hypothesize, for example, an abstention from a strike that results with a madman with nuclear capability, threatening world peace; conversely, we can hypothesize a strike that destabilizes a regime, and leads the way to the dawn of a new era. Granted, the public, and even the Israeli Prime-Minister or the President of the United States cannot know for certain which window of opportunities has opened or is about to close, what will be the response, the counter-response, or which way will the snowball go down and how fast.

The point being, that there is no certainty as to whether a strike is "good" or "bad," or what results it will bring. But one should still base a position based on a desired and perceived goal. In other words, not to "support" a strike or "oppose" a strike, but to "support a strike that is most likely to…" as well as "oppose a strike that is most likely to…"

Following these methodological remarks, I will state my own position, which will not be too far from that of Zakaria's, but I think that it is (a) more sincere, as I do not try to disqualify other stances based on worst-case scenarios and then promote my own based on optimal circumstances; and (b) modified and allowing for change, than the rigid 3-option approach outlined by Zakaria.

Points for Analysis

(1) Iran vs. Israel: I think that any discussion of nuclear Iran cannot be detached from a nuclear Middle-East, and therefore, cannot ignore the nuclear weapons of Israel. I consider Israel's nuclear power to have outlived its usefulness (if it ever had any), and deem it both morally and strategically unsound. In this sense, I have less of a problem when opposing a nuclear Iran than other Israelis (although I assume most Israelis are not conscious of this problem, since they consider their own nuclear power an asset, and Iran's nuclear power a threat).

(2) Iran as a Threat: I have noted more than once that Ahmedinejad's bark is by definition worse than his bite. Had he wished to destroy Israel with the press of a button, he would not try and attract so much bad press with claiming/insinuating that he will do so.
Thus, contrary to what Israelis claim, the moment Iran obtains nuclear power is not the Last Minute. There will be plenty of time afterwards to try and affect change within Iran, and between Iran and other countries.

(3) Possible results of actions: it is commonly accepted that a strike will not obliterate the Iranian nuclear program, only postpone its completion by a few years. Therefore, a strike should take into account not only the Iranian immediate retaliation, but also the need to execute a similar strike within few years after the first one. If the Iranian program is forced into a Sisyphean cycle, it might prove useless to Iranian leaders to go on pursuing it, for internal-political reasons as well as practical ones. Conversely, a one-time strike might place Iran as the victim, the one under threat (especially if it defies expectations, and does not retaliate the attack), thus giving it the time as well as the justification to develop its own program of defense (which will be nuclear, justified by the nuclear powers of those threatening it).

Engagement has had its recent success, even if one of a minor scale, and might continue to have some successes, as well as setbacks. I think that Obama's policies have already proven that while Iran is not ideally prone to dialogue with the West or openness to it, it is also not completely unchangeable.

Conclusions

There is more time than is portrayed by the drumbeaters in Israel. Politics, strategy and battles will not end the day Iran has nuclear powers. Israel and the US might not have much choices other than containing a nuclear Iran, but they can pursuit (together or separately) a change of nuclear course in the Middle-East. Therefore, I will support actions that aim at such a goal. I would not mind supporting a military strike on Iran if it serves to denuclearize the conflict. As such, it would need to be consistently more than one attack (granted, governments can change, and this is not something that can be assured beforehand in any case), and it would need to be combined with Israel joining the non-proliferation treaty, subjecting itself to IAEA inspections in the first stage, and consequentially disarming itself of nuclear weapons (no, I do not expect this to happen – which means I probably would oppose a strike on Iran under any practical circumstances). I would definitely support more diplomatic efforts, both concerning Iranian and Israeli nuclear weapons, and following Zakaria's warnings, I would hope that leaders are engaging in such a way that does not fortify the present regime and perpetuate the current situation, but rather demonstrate flexibility, knowing when it is wiser to impose pressure, and when leverage is necessary for change to occur.

Response to Zakaria: US Engagement / Containment with/of Iran

Fareed Zakaria's article in the latest issue of Newsweek ("Containing a Nuclear Iran") was a good read, although his argumentation was somewhat flawed. Had I known more of Zakaria's views or writings, I may have been able to judge or speculate as to the motives behind his final conclusion. Lacking that, I turn to the major flaws or self-contradictions which serve, to me, as signals for a pre-sought conclusion, rather than a well-thought, well-argued one.

Zakaria is fair enough to begin by stating the three options he perceives the US has regarding Iran: (1) bomb; (2) engage; (3) contain and deter. He further states that he will dismiss the first two, and favor the latter.

He dismisses the first option (a military strike) for reasons that he himself does not accept. He warns against a harsh Iranian response to such an attack, although he immediately admits: "I don't actually believe Iran is all that powerful." Granted – an attack on Iran will yield a counter-attack. The question is whether this counter-attack is worse than having a nuclear Iran or not. Many (including Zakaria) have noted that such a strike will not only be complex, but will also not completely stop the Iranian nuclear program, but rather postpone its completion. Therefore, the scale of Iranian response is crucial: if it is something that Israel and the US can contain in the long run, they might prefer to attack, thus postponing the program, suffering the counter-attack, and then recuperating for the next attack, should Iran proceed in the same speed to obtain nuclear power. Thus, by estimating Iran's ability to be limited, Zakaria has failed to dismiss the first option (within the framework that he has set up). His argumentation here is one of intimidation-rhetoric. He suffices with the mention of the possibilities of a counter-strike to dismiss this option, rather than weighing the pros and cons of a counter-strike within the debate over the nuclear power itself.

More importantly is his dubious argument against the second option of diplomatic engagement (including financial sanctions). Zakaria writes:

I do not believe the Iranian regime, at its core, wants normalized relations with America. Isolation from the West and hostility toward the United States are fundamental pillars that prop up the current regime—the reason that this system of government came into being and what sustains it every day. This is not simply a matter of ideology— though that is important—but economics. Those who rule in Tehran have created a closed, oligarchic economy that channels the country's oil revenues into the coffers of its religious foundations (for compliant clerics) and the increasingly powerful Revolutionary Guard. They benefit from a closed economy that they can manipulate. An opening to the world, which would mean more trade, commerce, and contact with the United States, would strengthen Iran's civil society, its trading class, its students, its bourgeoisie, and thus strengthen opposition to the regime.

An excellent point, which I wish more people would also apply when analyzing Israeli-Syrian relations, and the prospects of Peace in return for land (the Golan) when considering the structure, regime and economy in Syria.

However, when explaining why he supports the route of containment, Zakaria claims that:

[t]he ultimate solution to the problem of Iran will lie in an Iranian regime that understands it has much to gain from embracing the modern world. That doesn't mean Iran would forswear its efforts to be a regional power—all the losing presidential candidates in Iran endorsed the country's nuclear program—but it does mean that Iran would be more willing to be open and transparent, and to demonstrate its peaceful intentions. It would view trade and contact with the West as a virtue, not a threat. It would return Iran to its historic role as a crossroads of commerce and capitalism, as one of the most sophisticated trading states in history, and a place where cultures mingled to produce dazzling art, architecture, poetry, and prose. This Iran would have its issues with the West, but it would not be a rogue regime, funding terrorists and secretly breaking its international agreements.

Now, if this were possible, than obviously the second option of sanctions would also be valid. For that matter, even the first option of a strike would bear the power to deter Iran from its current route, since its leaders "would view trade and contact with the West as a virtue."

So what is Zakaria telling us? On the face of it, his argument is insincere. For the first two options, he draws a realistic-going-on-pessimistic scene, while for his favored third he draws a utopian one: for his model of containment to work, he requires a change of regime in Iran. Not only is this not a given in the calculations of the current heating conflict, but it is not foreseeable to a degree that it should be taken into consideration.

Does Zakariya honestly believe that a western engagement (military or diplomatic) only yield strengthening of conservativism in Iran, or does he also think that a nuclear umbrella might ensure a stability in the Middle East? If so, he has not stated it explicitly. On the other hand, what he has stated explicitly, in an articulated, 2500-word essay, does not make sense or convey sincerity.

[See next post for my own suggestions on forming a position on this matter, following my critique of Zakaria]

Another Response to Dan Fleshler

Original post and questions, here.


One state advocates, how do you know two states aren’t possible?
I actually do not accept the argument that the two-state solution is impossible. It is definitely possible. I think the government of Israel has the power (if it had the will) to evacuate most settlements (but not most settlers, assuming a solution that includes leaving major settlements as Ariel and Ma'aleh Adumim).
My problem is not with the feasibility of the two-state, but with the principles it promotes, and with the situation it will most likely generate after being implemented (more below).

The question is, which outcome is less unlikely? If you were forced to bet on the roulette wheel of history, would you honestly put your money on a secular bi-national state, a shared polity that is willingly accepted by both peoples after so much torment and violence and hatred? Or would you plunk it down on a deeply flawed compromise that satisfies neither people but which both agree is better than any practical alternative: two states, living side by side in an uneasy peace?

To answer that question, one would have to address the length of horizon in question. For the precise reasons that Fleshler cannot imagine a secular, peaceful bi-national state (after so much torment, violence, etc.), I do not believe that a two-state solution will yield two states living side by side in an uneasy peace, but will actually set the stage for the next phase of conflict, whether over the Right of Return, the implementation of 181, the rights of Palestinians in Israel proper, etc. If, in the long run, all these are to be overcome and resolved in a non-violent manner, then yes, I can also envision a bi-national state. If they cannot be resolved ,then they will remain an ongoing source of conflict whether within the framework of two states, or of a bi-national one.

You don’t need to lecture me on how Arabs in Israel are in many ways second-class citizens. I’ve probably been aware of that longer than most of you.

No need for that kind of language. I am not going to compete over who's been aware of what longer. The fact that Fleshler may be smarter, or has more experience in the field does not strengthen the argument. In short, it is an ad hominem argument.

Another question confounds me. Do you honestly believe there is NO distinction between the occupied territories and Israel west of the Green Line? There is no essential difference between the plight of Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinians under occupation? Folks, do you really believe Nablus in the West Bank is for all practical purposes the same as Sakhnin in the Gallilee?

Two issues to be addressed here: to answer the question honestly and directly, I will say I do make that distinction, and I whole-heartedly subscribe to Fleshler's criticism of those who do not. The fact that the Palestinian citizens of Israel are better off than the Palestinians in the West Bank, however, does not justify any wrongdoing or marginalization of them, no more than the fact that the West Bank has suffered less than Gaza strip in the past year can serve as an argument to continue the occupation there. Fine, Fleshler didn't try and justify problems of Israeli Palestinians using West Bank Palestinians either.

The big issue for me, however, when discussing the Palestinian minority in Israel, is not their personal condition and rights, but their role as a factor in the conflict. For years, the existence of a Palestinian nation was denied by Israel. Even after it was acknowledged, Israelis still refer to the Palestinian minority as "Arabs of Israel," as if they were only part of the large Arab ethnos, with no distinct nationality. The point is, that they are Palestinian, and addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without taking them into account is false.
The two-state solution presumes an evacuation of all Jews from it (namely the settlers), while leaving a substantial minority of 20% of Palestinians in Israel proper. For Israelis who support the two-state solution, a minority is insignificant as long as it does not have the electoral power to control parliament. Therefore, they can live with a two-state solution and an ongoing marginalized minority, consisting a fifth of Israel's population. In my view, this is untenable and immoral. Consider the French population of Canada or the Italian population in Switzerland. A mere 7% in Switzerland is represented in every public aspect, everywhere you go, in both the German and the French major cities of Switzerland. This is not only a question of political representation: that is granted to the Palestinian minority. They can vote, they have elected parties, there are Palestinian judges, etc. But they are under-represented (or not at all) in the country's culture, symbols and ethos. This cannot and will not change in the form of a Jewish State.

Not all Jews live in Israel. The United States alone has a more or less equal Jewish population as Israel. But once the State of Israel was founded, the Jewish people have no further demands as a nation. This is not the case with Palestinians. We know for a fact, and we can assume that this will only intensify after the implementation of a two-state solution, that Palestinians have demand for representation in Israel, and to accommodate the definition of Israel to include them as well. You can oppose that, you can hold that Israel will oppose that (and it will), but the meaning is that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will not subside with the partition of the land to two states. Mainly because, both Israelis and Palestinians continue to view the whole land between the River Jordan and the Mediterranean shore to be theirs. This can be compromised, and perhaps should be, but for that to happen representatives who are speaking in the name of all the Palestinian people should be included, just as Zionist representatives were the sole political representation of Jewish demands (even if some factions were not happy about that).

Finally, I oppose the two-state solution because I see more Israelis who support it out of will for separation than of co-existence. Remember Barak's slogan in 1999? "We are here – they will be there". This is the Israeli dream: no to have to see Palestinians anymore. To forget about it. To go on a shopping spree in Rome or London over the weekend, and forget that you're surrounded by Arabs.
A peace resolution should stress coexistence, cooperation and integration rather than an illusion of good riddance. Of course, coexistence can be formed and fortified through a two-state solution, which is why I do not maintain that any two-state solution will be terrible (see more here). However, most of the rhetoric of two-state supporters in Israel, as well as actual plans (such as the Geneva outline, see here), reflect separation, alienation and domination and not what I would like to see: equality and cooperation.

The solution should be grounded in the realization that neither side is going to magically vanish. Whether two-state or a bi-national state are more feasible is not as important as recognizing that coexistence is inevitable.

Five Questions on the Bi-National State Model for Solution

Following Dan Fleshler's post, where he quoted in full what he deemed "a devastating critique" by Hussein Ibish on the one-state solution, I offer my responses (original can be found here):


First, if Israel will not agree to end the occupation, what makes anyone think that it will possibly agree to dissolve itself? If Israel cannot be compelled or convinced to surrender 22 percent of the territory it holds, how can it be compelled or convinced to surrender or share 100 percent of it?

Mr. Ibish undermines his own argument here, since as he well points out, any current proposal, not to mention any demand by the Palestinians, is being turned down by the Israelis. Therefore, the fact that Israel will not agree "to dissolve itself" (I personally do not consider this to be the ends nor the form of the bi-national state, but for the sake of following Mr. Ibish's terminology), is completely besides the point. Does Mr. Ibish accept the continuation of the expansion of settlements or the disenfranchisement of Palestinians' freedom of movement simply because this Israel's will? Obviously, Israel's will is a factor to take into consideration when raising a solution, but as well demonstrated in the question, it cannot be the prominent, definitely not the first, factor.

Second, what, as a practical matter, does this vision of a single, democratic state offer to Jewish Israelis?

I have elaborated on this elsewhere. I will try to sum in brief: Zionism has been a failure, and it is too late by now to hope it will succeed. It envisioned transforming the Jewish people from a scattered race or ethnos into a territorially-based nation. It succeeded in the creation of a nation-state, but failed in transforming the whole Jewish people into this one nation. This failure will remain. Notwithstanding, the Jewish-Israeli community has developed quite impressively, into a distinct nation with its idiosyncratic culture, language (and slang), arts, etc. This national culture is related to its Jewish roots, but is also distinctly separate from it.

Whether in an Israeli-nationalist state, or one community within a multicultural, pluralistic bi-national state, this community will continue to flourish and inspire Jews around the world.

Mr. Ibish, makes here, by the way, a common mistake, of taking the one-state solution, as the formation of a new nation, one that will not include or represent Israeli Jews. I continue to insist that this is not a one-nation state, but a bi-national state, with distinct cultures and nations living under the same rule and government, as the best bureaucratic solution, for the fact that both nations feel connection to the full width of the land, from the River Jordan to the Mediterranean.

Third, what efforts have Palestinian and pro-Palestinian one-state advocates made in reaching out to mainstream Jews and Israelis and to incorporating their national narrative into this vision?

I am out of my element in answering this one. However, I have noted elsewhere (only on my Hebrew blog, unfortunately), the characteristic difference between Palestinians who have Israeli citizenship and who support this paradigm, knowing that co-existence with Israeli Jews is feasible, practical and perhaps even desirable, in contrast to those who have little or no contact with Israeli Jews, who (wrongly) envision such a state as means of destructing the State of Israel.

Fourth, how do one-state advocates propose to supersede or transcend Palestinian national identity and ambitions? Why is it that no significant Palestinian political party or faction has adopted the one-state goal?

I mentioned above the Jewish national identity and its inclusion in the One-State model (in its bi-national form). This is true of the Palestinian side, too. Furthermore, I think it serves Palestinian identity better than the two-state solution, as it does not deny the Palestinian identity of Israeli Palestinians, nor does it rob Palestinians of their national connection to Haifa, Jaffa, Acre, and many more, as the two-state will.

Fifth, how, apart from empty slogans about largely nonexistent and highly implausible boycotts, do one-state advocates propose to realize or advance their vision? What practical steps do they imagine and what is their road map for success?

1. Cease of all collective punishment to Palestinians, including freedom of movement, freedom of speech, and other common manifestations of occupation. Terrorism will be addressed specifically, without hysteria and without generalizations, as if it were no more than another form of crime in Israel.

2. At first, all Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza will be granted permanent residence in Israel, allowing them to work and trade with Israelis and in Israel.

3. Israeli and international industrial entrepreneurs will be encouraged to develop industry in the West Bank and Gaza, abiding laws of minimum wage, fair trade, etc.

4. Intense educational efforts will be made to prepare the next generation for college, to be able to fit Israel's needs of hi-tech industry.

5. Bi-national groups fostering inter-cultural dialogue will be sponsored by the state and international community.

All these measures will be pursued regardless of terrorism or the situation of the peace negotiations.

6. Within a year, the Palestinian people will go to elections, voting a government that will be responsible for the negotiations with Israel. These elections will take place once every four years, regardless of who is in power, and the situation of the peace negotiations.
Palestinians who hold Israeli citizenship will have the right to choose to register either for Israeli elections, or Palestinian elections. Dual citizenship will not be allowed at this stage.

7. The negotiations will focus on a constitution of the Israeli-Palestinian Republic, recognizing the historic, religious and national ties of both nations to the Holy Land. The constitution will secure the secularization and democratic nature of the state, including freedom of religion, freedom of movement, freedom of speech. In addition to the constitution, the two sides will negotiate and agree upon the following: the early form of the joint parliament (see #9); laws concerning the firm hand against hate-crimes from both sides, laws concerning compensation for loss of land and lives; laws concerning immigration and nationalization process (quotas will no doubt be set, the "Law of Return" and the "Right of Return" will not be fully implemented, but modified to fit the absorption possibility of the land, and fears on both sides).

8. Having agreed on the constitution, representatives of both sides will sign it. General elections will take place within two years of ratifying the constitution. During these two years, the by-laws of the constitution will be legislated in both parliaments. Israeli citizens and Palestinian permanent residents will be equally naturalized.

9. Following elections, a parliament will be formed according to the negotiated form as one of the by-laws of the constitution. The form will reflect the mutual fears of both sides, either by having two houses of parliament with a joint government, or securing a half-half representation of Jewish and Palestinian parties. This will only be the initial form, to be changed into equal votes and representation according to size of population after three terms (or twelve years) of parliament.


Having given my "road-map", I turn to the supporters of the two-state solution, such as Mr. Fleshler and Mr. Ibish: as far as I can see, the two-state solution fails to address the Palestinian identity of a significant minority in Israel, unrepresented in the state's ethos, emblems and public culture; it fails to represent the wrong-doing and loss of Palestinians during Israel's war of independence (known to them as the Nakbah), and fosters seperationism, suspicion and hatred rather than dialogue and co-existence. As such, it cannot ensure neither peace nor equality to either of the nations. To me, these concerns are graver than the concerns of national identity.

Unwarranted Advice for New Graduate Students

As a new academic year is about to begin, here are my two cents for new graduate students, hopefully relevant or useful to some:

The one important thing to remember when entering Grad School can be phrased in the wise words of Rabbi Tarfon (one of my favorite quotes): It is not for you to accomplish the task, nor are you free to desist from it (m. Avot 2:21).

In academia, "it is not for you to accomplish the task", translates as "it is impossible for you to accomplish the task." You will never have enough time to read everything you want to read. You will never be able to know all the knowledge that all your teachers put together know. You will never write a flawless paper.

Now, the challenge before you is to turn this insight not into a pitfall of despair, nor into a license to slack. You should use it as consolation and motivation. Okay, so your paper will never be flawless. That does not allow you to write a sloppy paper, but it means it's okay if you haven't covered every single issue you would like it to address, if you forgot a footnote, or made a mistake. So you will never have the time to read everything you want to read. The solution is not to stop reading but to accept it, and not to be embarrassed by your own ignorance at times. "Oh, I haven't read that yet" or even "it sounds fascinating, but I doubt that I will ever feel I have the time to read something so remote from my field" are permissible, and not a source of shame.

The second half of the quote is especially important in this context: "nor are you free to desist." If you are entering Grad School you know that you are not free to desist not because of an assignment, or because someone expects you to read. Your own inquisitiveness compels you to read more, to think more, to ever broaden your horizons, and at the same time to focus your gaze on very specialized and minute issues.

The academic enterprise (and I am talking as a student of the Humanities here) is one of a conversational nature. By stepping into research, you are joining a conversation that has been going on for generations. Long before any of us were born, and which should continue long after we are gone.

It would be a shame to expect of oneself to be able to take lead of the conversation upon entering the room. It would also be a shame to keep silent.

So, remind yourself of your inherent imperfections from time to time, as a way of reassurance. It's okay not to know everything, or not to have read everything. At the same time, don't exploit your inherent imperfections in order to stop trying or to demand less of yourself. You made it so far, because of your interests, your original thought and incisiveness. Continue enjoying those and make them public for the benefit of others. Accept that you will not have the final word in this ever-ongoing conversation, and that it will take time for you to feel confident to speak up.

Value and Values on Life-Matters

Although it might seem obvious to some, I think it is worth stating:

There are some things in life, which should not be measured in money. We measure them in money out of necessity, but that does not mean that this is their only value. Setting them in a framework of a business, of people making profit out of it, can only ill-serve them.

These things are, above all, issues related to life and death. Turning war or health into a commodity form which to gain profit, means people dying or being killed for others to make a profit. This is not a healthy situation. I would even say that this is a dangerous situation. All the more so when the people making the profit and the people dying are not coming into any form of contact. To phrase this bluntly: the murderer who shoots the old lady to steal her purse at least had to stand in front of her and watch the consequences of his action, before taking the purse.

The situation cannot be solved by avoiding any form of money relating to these issues, of course. Doctors must be paid, as well as any other care-givers. Soldiers need to have an income. At the same time, one is compelled to question the criteria: when does a paid soldier stop being a paid soldier and become a mercenary? If it is clear to us that doctors and nurses should be paid, certainly we agree that an administrative staff of a hospital deserves income – but what circle is too remote from the primary care, to turn the money involved into "dirty" – money gained by someone's suffering, with no aspect of compensation for helping them in their suffering?

The questions are tough, and solutions will be more complex, if found at all. However, clear-cut principles are necessary to restate: the line should be drawn so that the money involved is closer to compensation and reward, rather than profit. Those gaining should be actively involved in helping people, not in acting against them.

It is the responsibility of the State to form the laws and guidelines that furnish this line of ethics. Those in the business of making money from other people's death (partially or directly due to their responsibility), should be compelled to seek ways to change their misconduct, as their form of making a profit should not be tenable in a democracy.

Food for thought:

- http://articles.latimes.com/writers/lisa-girion
- http://www.blackwaterwatch.com/

Thoughts and Praise on JfJfP - Jews for Justice for Palestinians

[Click here for a Hebrew version of this post.]

I met with Dan Judelson of Jews for Justice for Palestinians this week. I prepared a mental list of questions that interest me, concerning political activism around Israel / Middle East in England. The two major questions I had could be focused on the title of the organization: (a) why (only) Jews? and (b), why (only) for Palestinians? The thing that struck me the most in the meeting with Dan, is that these two questions were answered before I had the chance to ask them. These topics simply came up in the first introductory remarks that Dan made about JFJFP. To me, this was perhaps the most important sign for a good political organization.

I’ll explain: the biggest danger of any political organization is that it can become political in the sense of party politics, concerned solely with its image in the media, its survival and/or growth. When a political organization turns into this solely-politics groups, it obviously loses its justification of existence, but more importantly it fossilizes in its old beliefs, afraid that any shift of opinions might turn people away, or seem like an admission of failure (I think Peace Now is a good example for that in Israeli politics).

The most important pre-emptive remedy against this fossilization is a constant introspection and self-criticism, not fearing that questioning one’s own stance weakens it, but rather recognizes that it is precisely this self-questioning and the acknowledgment that the stance is not perfect or free of flaws that endows with its power of truth. Having stressed that I believe JFJFP to be a vibrant, thoughtful political organization, I return to those two questions that bugged me before meeting Dan, and that I was happy to find out that people at JFJFP are even more concerned about them than I am.

Why (only) Jews? I have sought more than once a venue for political action (or at least, a platform for dialogue) concerning Israel in Princeton. I sadly had to recognize that I have to options: a pro-Israel Jewish group, or a pro-Palestine group. I don’t identify myself as either pro-Israel or pro-Palestinian, if either of those labels compels me to support wrongdoings of either side. I am an Israeli, and as such have stronger, uncontrollable sentiments for Israel than for Palestine, but I am not pro-Israel. I am pro-peace and pro-equality. As such, I will be equivocally critical of Israelis and Palestinians when their actions do not correlate with my vision for peace, equality and co-existence.

Why, then, I asked Dan, a need for a Jewish peace group? Why not simply a peace organization that is inclusive and not based on ethnicity or religion (depending on your understanding of Jewish)? The important thing to keep in mind is that JFJFP is a Jewish organization that constantly questions this limit of identity, as I said. The on-going collaboration of JFJFP with other groups is a proof that this definition of Jewish certainly does not point to an understanding as if only Jews can support a peace in the middle-east, or any other understanding of Jewish exceptionalism. Rather, it is a response to the consensus of Jewish communities, including the UK, which tends to be pro-Israel as such. In other words, it is precisely the actions of Jewish organizations, portraying Jews as unconditionally supportive of Israel, that furnishes the background for the justification for a different Jewish voice. One that will most probably not replace other Jewish voices, but contributes to the diversity of opinions, diffusing to a degree the view that sees all Jews as holding the same opinion or subscribing to the same loyalties.

Why (only) for Palestinians? This question can be divided to several different questions, mainly the nationalist question (“why are you more concerned about Palestinians than about Jews?”) or the not-so-naïve-as-it-may-seem cosmopolitan question (“why are you more concerned about Israeli oppression of Palestinians than about Chinese oppression / Darfur / Global Warming / the price of underwear these days?”)

Personally, I don’t find either question valid, since they assume a political activist is acting in a void. A person who chooses to invest their time and efforts in the Palestinian cause does not claim that it is more important than global warming. Rather, being well-aware that there is activity done for global warming, he or she seek activity in an issue that is personally closer to their hearts. In other words, no-one has endless resources to attend to all the problems of the world. Therefore, the “cosmopolitan” question is ultimately a call for no-action.

As for the Zionist/nationalist version of this question, Dan had an interesting take on it. First of all, the question implies that Jews/Israelis and Palestinians share an equal status right now, and therefore deserve equally the same justice. Of course, both Israelis and Palestinians deserve justice, but the title of JFJFP, recognizes that Palestinians suffer right now from injustice, an acknowledgment many Jews will have a hard time to accept.

Dan and I agreed that the nation-state is probably not the best form of union or manner of promoting justice in the world, but as long as it exists, the Jewish people have a right for a nation-state, as do the Palestinians. In this, by the way, Dan admitted that he does not represent the whole of JFJFP as its members represent a wide range of approaches to Israel and Zionism, from anti-Zionism on one end to Zionism on the other.

So, back to the question, why “(only) for Palestinians”? First of all, “Justice” is an operative word in that title. It is not “Jews for Palestine” (a reassuring emphasis, for my readers who know my disapproval of left-wing confusion of humanitarian struggle of the Palestinians with their national struggle); nor is it “Jews for Palestinians”. It is specifically targeting the injustice Palestinians suffer by Israel. It does not even claim that this is the only injustice in Israel. However, it is the one injustice that transcends beyond the boundaries of inner-social conflicts and bears consequences on international law and the international arena – which reminds me of another question we touched on.

This title bears it price, of course, especially among those who hear “for Palestinians” and interpret that to mean “against Israel”. This is a notion that is not completely false, to be frank, since Israelis and Palestinians are in a national struggle over the same piece of land. JFJFP, however, does not deny that struggle, only recognizes the current superiority of Israel, and the justice that both sides will have to benefit for the conflict to end.

The onslaught on Gaza in January (“Cast Lead”) brought the highest single jump of supporters to JFJFP, of about 10%. This is the kind of data Israeli leaders should definitely take into account when making decisions. Hopefully, Israelis will too begin to realize that pro-Israel need not equate “anti-Palestine,” nor “pro-Israel no matter what.”

Who are you to say? This is a question I was sure we were going to reach, although I personally deem it invalid as well. “You’re not living in Israel, therefore you have no right to tell Israelis what to do.” This is invalid for two reasons: first of all, many people who hold such a stance only hold it when it comes to criticizing the Israeli government. I’ve yet to hear someone claim – “you don’t live in Israel, therefore you have no right to raise a contribution to support the IDF / JNF / MDA, etc.” More importantly, I don’t acknowledge any constraints on freedom of thought. Like it or not, people form opinions about Israel living there or not, in the same vain that Israelis have strong opinions on Barack Obama, Gordon Brown, Nicolas Sarkozy, and so forth. Having a political group that addresses Israel’s wrongdoings in the international arena is no less legitimate than having an Israeli group supporting Tibet, and even more so, when taking into account the substantial support of Jewish Diaspora to, in fact, the sustainability of the State of Israel.

To these points of mine (I think we shared a sentiment there), Dan also added that it seems that Pro-Israel Jews are quick to criticize JFJFP for taking a stand on something they can’t hardly grasp (supposedly because they don’t live there), but that you would never hear a similar critique of a Jewish group taking on a remote issue, such as supporting demonstrations in Iran or in Myanmar. It is only a critical approach to Israel that raises this attack of “you don’t live there, therefore you can’t possibly know.”

The talk segued between the political to the personal, and encompassed much more than I can fit in this brief report. I deeply appreciated the depth and thoughtfulness, as I stated in the beginning, and was greatly impressed by the vast and diverse ties JFJFJP maintains with other activist groups in Israel and internationally. I am adding their website to my favorites, as an excellent resource of information, and invite readers to do the same.

[I tried meeting with activists in New York as well, by the way – from JATO and J-Street – but apparently they are too busy there to meet with your humble servant.]

What Isaac Luria "Knows"

In a message sent yesterday to J-Street subscribers against the equation of stopping settlements in the West Bank with ethnic cleansing (agreeably an unsound equation), Isaac Luria writes:

Unbelievable. As someone who cares about Israel's future, I know that stopping settlements - as well as Palestinian incitement and violence - are first steps towards a secure, Jewish, and democratic Israel through a two-state solution. Using terms like "ethnic cleansing" to undermine that agenda is incendiary and dangerous - and, I believe, not pro-Israel.

How does Luria know that stopping settlements are related to a secure, democratic Israel, or even a two-state solution? Perhaps he is endowed with some prophetic foresight. But as for myself, all I have are the facts on the ground. The fact is that the biggest disenfranchisement of freedom of movement from Palestinians, the most vile form of occupation, as well as the most elusive (and therefore also the worst) is taking place in Gaza strip, where settlements have all been destroyed three summers ago.

Israeli occupation of 1967 Palestinians is indeed undemocratic and should end. However, the settlements are merely one of the means of this occupation, and by far not the most important one. The one thing we've learned from the disengagement from Gaza, is that Israel can remove settlements and continue the unlawful occupation, while denying it to itself and the world.

The kind of rhetoric Luria presents conveys the precise "knowledge" that furnished the support for the disengagement plan, and will eventually lead to the same mistake in support of removal of settlements from Gaza. It will not provide peace and justice for Palestinians nor Israelis.

To learn more on the occupation in Gaza and how it continues to flourish without the settlements, read the detailed report by Gisha center (website).